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InTroDucTIon
Carbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”) is receiv-ing new and intense focus globally, driven by climate change and potential economic benefits. At an energy 
symposium this past December, the Australian Government 
announced its $100 million commitment to the Global Carbon 
Capture and Storage Institute.1 
In so doing, Australia noted 
that by 2030, global energy 
demand is estimated to rise by 
fifty-five percent, with emis-
sions of sixty-two gigatons 
(“GT”) globally, thus empha-
sizing the need for an increase 
in CCS efforts worldwide.2 
Echoing these sentiments, 
a number of research initia-
tives have begun in the United 
States, highlighted by the Regional Carbon Sequestration Part-
nerships, sponsored by the Department of Energy (“DOE”).3 
President Barack Obama has also emphasized the need for 
CCS, including in his energy plan the intent to “instruct DOE 
to enter into public-private partnerships to develop 5 ‘first-of-a-
kind’ commercial scale coal-fired plants with carbon capture and 
sequestration.”4 While this research is identifying effective tech-
nologies to make CCS a practical reality, it has not yet broached 
the legal and regulatory challenges associated with large-scale 
CCS projects to substantively reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions.
That these questions remained unanswered reveals the com-
plicated legal truths regarding CCS—any project must navigate 
a complicated web of state and federal property rights issues, 
address public safety concerns, and develop risk mitigation 
measures to ensure long-term efficacy. Thus far, no one in the 
United States has taken the lead to establish a legal and regula-
tory framework for CCS.
As one of the largest producers of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) 
emissions in the United States, California is prominently posi-
tioned to lead the way in setting CCS precedents on a regional 
basis. Given California’s historical position on the vanguard of 
environmental issues, it is likely that its involvement in the CCS 
discussion will also have a formative effect on establishing the 
national legal and regulatory framework necessary for efficient, 
effective, and successful geologic CCS (“GCCS”).
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Accordingly, this article considers the legal risks inherent 
in CCS projects through the lens of California law, focusing 
on GCCS.5 Because the law of GCCS is undeveloped, many of 
the considerations discussed are directly applicable to assessing 
legal risk in other jurisdictions. Ultimately, surveying the many 
issues that impact such risk may help eliminate barriers to large-
scale, commercially viable GCCS 
projects that are necessary to 
meaningfully reduce GHG emis-
sions, regionally, nationally, and 
internationally.
First, the article provides a 
brief overview of the mechanics 
of GCCS. Then the article iden-
tifies and discusses one of the 
fundamentals to assessing GCCS 
risk—ownership. Next, it analyzes 
potential liabilities confronting 
any GCCS project in California, drawing on legal principles that 
are readily analogous to other jurisdictions. Finally, it proposes 
some mechanisms to manage the risks associated with GCCS.
The basIcs oF geologIc carbon capTure  
anD seQuesTraTIon
As the name implies, GCCS involves the capture and 
sequestration of CO2 for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. 
Simply put, CO2 must first be captured, pre-combustion, post-
combustion, or by oxy-firing combustion.6 It then must be stored 
permanently (in contrast to enhanced oil recovery (“EOR”), in 
which CO2 is not sequestered permanently).
Three basic forms of CCS exist: (1) terrestrial sequestration, 
involving trees, grasses, soils, or algae; (2) deep-sea sequestra-
tion, involving containment and dissolving in deep oceans; and 
(3) geologic CCS. GCCS utilizes underground reservoirs, such 
as depleted oil and gas fields, saline aquifers, and un-mineable 
coal seams. Research efforts thus far show that GCCS in saline 
formations has the greatest near-term potential to reduce GHG 
emissions, although the legal and regulatory challenges are 
California is prominently 
positioned to lead the way 
in setting CCS precedents 
on a regional basis.
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great.7 However, geologic sequestration is not new. Millions of 
tons of CO2 are injected each year. Projects such as Statoil at 
Sleipner, BP at In Salah, and the EnCana EOR project have been 
operating for years.
The process of GCCS begins with capturing CO2 from fossil-
fuel power plants, cement plants, petroleum refineries, etc.8 The 
gas stream is then scrubbed, resulting in virtually pure CO2.
9 It 
is then compressed and cooled to 
a supercritical state, during which 
it exhibits characteristics of both 
liquid and gas.10 Once supercriti-
cal, the CO2 is transported to the 
injection site by truck (pipelines 
are expected once commercial 
projects get started).11
Once at the injection site, 
the captured, purified, and com-
pressed CO2 is injected through 
wells into “pore space” deep 
below the surface of one or more 
cap rock formations.12 Pore space 
consists of porous sedimentary 
rock layers, formed from sand, 
mud, or ancient shells, that allow 
the passage of fluids.13 Sedimen-
tary rock occurs in layers, flanked 
by other layers of impermeable rock, such as mudstone and 
clay.14 These impermeable layers trap water, oil, and gas beneath 
and between them.15 Depths of between 3,000 and 15,000 feet 
are generally considered ideal for GCCS because pore space 
at that depth is often comprised of saline aquifers, containing 
ancient, trapped saltwater with high levels of dissolved solids.16 
The water in these deep saline reservoirs is considered com-
mercially “useless” because of its depth and contamination.17 In 
deep saline formations, it is theorized that supercritical CO2 will 
flow as a distinct liquid on top, displacing and compressing the 
saline water below it.18 When injection ceases, scientific mod-
els predict that the CO2 will remain hydro-dynamically trapped 
at the top of the aquifer by the cap rock or other impermeable 
layer, remaining in place for thousands of years.19
Estimates put the geologic storage capacity in saline forma-
tions in the United States at a vast 3,300 to 12,000 billion metric 
tons.20 In California alone, DOE estimates the storage space in 
deep saline formations to be between 76 and 303 billion metric 
tons.21 To put this in perspective, California emits an estimated 
104 million metric tons of CO2 per year.
22 Thus, the poten-
tial impact on reducing these emissions into the atmosphere is 
great—but not without legal challenges.
gccs ownershIp Issues
Because of the long-term nature of GCCS, ownership issues 
regarding real property interests and long-term liability are criti-
cal and unique, centered on the question of pore space.23 In many 
regions, the law of ownership regarding subsurface mineral and 
water rights is well developed. However, no clear answers exist 
as to the ownership of pore space.24 This issue is slowly being 
addressed at the state level, as Wyoming, Texas, and Illinois 
have recently enacted statutory provisions regarding pore space 
and liability, but only for specific CCS purposes.25 The appli-
cation of the concept of the “negative rule of capture,” and its 
associated statutory provisions, are also untested in the GCCS 
context.26
In California, the surface 
owner generally owns the 
rights to property below the 
surface, “to the center of the 
earth, and above the surface 
to the heavens.”27 Thus, if the 
surface and subsurface rights 
have not been severed, the pore 
space should remain with the 
surface owner. However, cir-
cumstances exist in which the 
perceived public interest is sub-
stantial and the potential prop-
erty use is limited by practical 
considerations. For instance, 
airplanes enter airspace above 
property at a safe altitude with-
out it constituting a trespass. 
Access to navigable water 
and shorelines is treated similarly. As such, the public interest 
aspects of GCCS may affect ownership as GCCS becomes a 
more integral part of climate change solutions.
Similarly, the issue of ownership of pore space for CCS 
purposes has not been determined by either legislative action 
or express judicial decisions. The recent report and model rules 
released by the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission, as 
well as numerous statements by various parties, including Cali-
fornia state entities, have taken the position that the ownership 
of such pore space, particularly in saline formations as opposed 
to hydrocarbon formations, is undetermined.28
While no California court has explicitly vested pore space 
ownership in the surface owner of a severed estate for CCS pur-
poses, absent legislative action or “judicial activism,” it appears 
that the better argument is that pore space ownership resides 
with the surface owner and generally remains so even if mineral 
rights are severed. A surface owner who has conveyed its min-
eral rights and severed the estate, 
own[s] nearly all rights in the land except for the exclu-
sive right to drill for and produce oil, gas and other 
hydrocarbons. The owners of the mineral estate . . . 
typically hold only the very limited right . . . to drill 
and capture subsurface oil and gas, and the incidental 
rights necessary to accomplish this. Thus . . . the les-
see generally obtains only a nonpossessory interest in 
real property to capture such substances, which is in the 
nature of an easement.29
Accordingly, absent express language in the mineral grant, 
pore space ownership “should” likely remain with the surface 
Because of the  
long-term nature of GCCS, 
ownership issues 
regarding real property 
interests and long-term 
liability are critical  
and unique, centered on 
the question of pore space.
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owner despite severance; however, the wording of the opera-
tive agreements must be evaluated to determine whether or not 
a broader conveyance occurred than is typical. This conclusion 
is supported by a number of cases in other jurisdictions address-
ing ownership of storage space for natural gas.30 Gas storage 
cases in Texas, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Mich-
igan have all stated that the surface owner, and not a mineral 
rights holder, retains ownership of pore space.31 Nonetheless, 
even assuming a court of first instance applied the above logic 
to GCCS, a risk of tort liability remains on severed estates if the 
mineral rights are not also acquired prior to injection, as migrat-
ing or escaping CO2 could allegedly interfere with the mineral 
rights, as discussed below.
rIsks oF ownershIp anD operaTIon oF a  
ccs projecT In calIFornIa
The focus of the experimental and pilot GCCS projects is 
the validation of the scientific models. While awaiting this vali-
dation, however, various risks must be evaluated. The first con-
cern for a developer, for obvious reasons, is what happens if it 
is alleged that injected CO2 does not remain sequestered in the 
manner expected. At the same time, a number of non-release 
legal risks also exist, even if captured CO2 behaves as theorized. 
Whatever the cause, a GCCS project may encounter tort, nui-
sance, negligence, and/or strict liability claims. The more liti-
gious the culture of the jurisdiction, the more likely such issues 
will be raised even in circumstances where GCCS performs to 
optimal expectations.
liability fRom ReleaSe eventS
In most circumstances, these liabilities will likely result if 
there is unexpected behavior of captured CO2, such as migra-
tion offsite from the saline injection reservoir into a linked adja-
cent subsurface saline reservoir, where the pore space is located 
within a larger saline reservoir that extends to other estates. 
Theoretically, in some circumstances, CO2 could also migrate 
through new faults or fractures into an unlinked adjacent subsur-
face saline reservoir; an adjacent hydrocarbon or mineral forma-
tion; groundwater; other adjacent subsurface strata; or onto the 
surface itself.32
If a GCCS site was not selected properly, theoretically, 
captured CO2 might also react unexpectedly in the designated 
property, leading to potential liability if all surface and subsur-
face rights for the injection area had not been acquired. In those 
circumstances, CO2 might migrate into other unacquired saline, 
hydrocarbon, or other mineral formations under the designated 
property. CO2 might also migrate into other subsurface strata or 
groundwater stores under the designated property, or onto the 
unacquired surface at or near the injection point.33
While all of these possibilities might result in allegations 
of liability, the area of greatest concern would likely be from 
allegations of migration into hydrocarbon or other mineral for-
mations, groundwater,34 and onto the surface,35 rather than from 
migration within the deep saline aquifer under adjacent property. 
This is due to the likely absence of any provable legal damages 
resulting from a theoretical CO2 migration, as discussed below.
If a release of CO2 from the injection reservoir did occur for 
whatever reason, this could theoretically expose a GCCS project 
to allegations for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liabil-
ity for operation of an ultrahazardous activity. While no Califor-
nia court has addressed these issues for GCCS, analogues exist 
within other subject areas, as well as in other jurisdictions.
tReSpaSS
Trespass is the “‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of 
another,” regardless of motive.36 A trespass may be permanent 
or continuing, with a continuing trespass constituting a series of 
separate injuries that can be discontinued or abated.37 The classi-
fication as one or the other impacts statute of limitations issues, 
as well as potential damages amounts.38
While no California court has addressed subsurface trespass 
in the GCCS context, when injecting waste fluids, “causing sub-
surface migration of fluids into a mineral estate without consent 
constitutes a trespass.”39 However, courts may not hold CO2 
injection directly analogous to waste fluid injection, and migra-
tion into a saline aquifer may not be treated the same as a migra-
tion into a mineral estate. More importantly, as discussed below, 
because deep saline aquifers have no value for mineral extrac-
tion or groundwater use, courts may find no damages.
In the event damages are found, the general measure is that 
“which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused 
thereby whether it could have been anticipated or not.”40 If a tres-
pass is permanent, all past and future damages are recoverable 
in one action.41 In instances of trespass for subsurface migra-
tion of fluids into a mineral estate, a normal measure of damages 
for trespass is the reasonable rental value of the property during 
the course of the trespass.42 However, courts have flexibility and 
award the deterioration in the market value of the mineral estate, 
the costs of disposing of the substances causing the trespass, and 
the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the injector.43
nuiSance
Under California law, a nuisance is an interference with the 
use and enjoyment of a property right.44 This interference must 
constitute unreasonable conduct that causes substantial harm.45 
As with trespass, a nuisance can be permanent or continuing.46 
If a nuisance is permanent, a party may only bring one action to 
recover all damages, including anticipated future damages.47
A plaintiff may seek either injunctive relief or damages in 
connection with a nuisance.48 The measure of damages, like 
those for trespass, is “the amount which will compensate for all 
the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have 
been anticipated or not.”49 A plaintiff may recover damages for 
annoyance, discomfort, inconvenience, and mental suffering, 
even absent physical damage.50 If a nuisance is intentional, a 
court may award punitive or exemplary damages.51 Damages 
may also consider diminution of the property value.52 If a nui-
sance is continuing and can be abated, a plaintiff may seek an 
injunction and damages accruing prior to the abatement. If the 
nuisance continues, a plaintiff may bring successive actions for 
additional damages, so long as any prior award of damages did 
not include anticipated future damages.53
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negligence
A party is liable in California for negligence for injuries 
caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care given the cir-
cumstances.54 Damages can be compensatory to “[restore] the 
plaintiff as nearly as possible to his or her former position, 
or [give] some pecuniary equivalent,” as well as punitive.55 
Although the reasonable care standard is not judicially devel-
oped, it is expected that a court will consider the public benefit 
of sequestration in imposing a duty, in addition to the traditional 
negligence considerations of foreseeability, extent of harm, and 
causation.56 This consideration will analyze the consequences to 
the public of the imposed duty, as well as the social utility of the 
activity.57 The public policy aspects of CCS are in an evolution-
ary stage. 
StRict liability
Under California law, strict liability is imposed for ultrahaz-
ardous activities (“UHA”), defined as “certain activities [that] 
create such a serious risk of danger that it is justifiable to place 
liability for the loss on the person engaging in them, regardless 
of lack of culpability.”58 Classification of UHAs differs from 
nuisance activities because UHAs are lawful and cannot be abat-
ed.59 Strict liability for UHAs is limited only to harm within the 
scope of the abnormal risk created, and applies only to the class 
of persons exposed to the abnormal risk.60
Because of these factors, a court must individually analyze 
the factual scenario for a claim to determine if the “risk created 
is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the 
circumstances . . . as to justify the imposition of strict liability 
from the harm that results . . . even though it is carried on with 
all reasonable care.”61 Because strict liability is a theory of tort 
recovery, compensatory and punitive damages are the appropri-
ate remedies, as applicable.62
Thus, the question of GCCS as a UHA is unique to each 
project. GCCS by its nature does not appear to pose an abnormal 
risk. However, as is commonly said, “bad facts make bad law.” 
If unfortunate circumstances occurred, potential exists for the 
law to evolve in an unanticipated manner.
Select conSiDeRationS impacting liability
Released CO2: The Question of Damages
Although unexpected migration of CO2 may technically 
constitute a tort, an open question exists as to proving damages. 
While no California court has directly addressed damages in 
CO2 sequestration, courts have decided the issue in the context 
of subsurface injection of fluids, which has analogues in oil, 
gas, and hazardous waste injection case law, both in California 
and in other jurisdictions. Accordingly, if no identifiable dam-
age exists, a claim for unauthorized subsurface migration may 
fail. In the controlling California case on subsurface migration, 
Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of California, injected waste water 
ultimately migrated into plaintiff’s mineral estate, resulting in 
“widespread damage throughout a large oil, gas and mineral 
field.”63 Because this injection interfered with plaintiff’s right 
to extract commodities, the court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s award of rental value for the trespass—the market price 
for the cost of wastewater injection.64
If courts adopt this reasoning, which seems most appropri-
ate, no damages should exist absent interference with another’s 
mineral rights. Given that GCCS injects CO2 into deep saline 
reservoirs, presumed to be devoid of any extractable minerals of 
value, the resulting encroachment within the saline reservoir on 
an adjoining estate should fail for lack of damages. Similarly, if 
the injected CO2 migrates into unacquired strata on the acquired 
property containing no commodities, no damage should result.
These conclusions are consistent with the Ohio case Chance 
v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,65 which establishes the precedent oft cited 
by GCCS prognosticators that no damage exists for subsurface 
migration of materials into adjacent landowners property absent 
a reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface by the adja-
cent landowner.66
GCCS Permitting Probably Will Not Yield a Permit 
Shield Defense
Currently, the injection of CO2 will require a permit under 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water 
Act (“SDWA”).67 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) has recently proposed a new class of well under SDWA 
(Class VI) and minimum technical criteria for injection of 
CO2.
68 This new permit would require adherence to a number 
of regulations aimed at preventing CO2-related contamination of 
underground drinking water.69 This begs the question of whether 
permitting of GCCS projects will protect an operator from 
liability in the event of a release with a “permit shield.”70 An 
examination of SDWA reveals that operators should expect no 
such defense, as SDWA does not contain the required specific 
language providing for a permit shield defense. Even if such a 
defense was clearly articulated in the statute, courts generally 
interpret permit shields to protect a permittee only from civil 
and criminal penalties assessed through a citizen suit or govern-
ment action, and not common law claims such as trespass and 
nuisance.71
liabilitieS foR non-ReleaSe eventS
Unlike the risks of release of CO2, these liabilities represent 
possible costs to a GCCS project before initiation and/or even if 
captured CO2 remains sequestered as expected.
Environmental Permitting Challenges
In efforts to obtain appropriate permits and regulatory clear-
ance on the state and federal level, a GCCS project may face 
significant and costly litigation before getting off of the ground. 
These costs most likely will come by way of challenges to per-
mits required for compliance with SDWA and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) on the federal level, the 
California Environmental Quality Action (“CEQA”) on the state 
level, and other local regulations.
It is difficult to predict the form of a challenge to a GCCS 
project’s SDWA permitting, as EPA issued proposed rules for 
GCCS that have not yet been finalized (discussed above). In the 
interim, a challenge to a GCCS permit could come pursuant to 
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a formal EPA guidance document issued to EPA staff and all 
EPA Regions covering issuance of permits for geologic seques-
tration under the existing SDWA regulations for underground 
injection.72 While it is arguable that noncompliance with such a 
document could support some action by EPA, it is unlikely that 
a private party could avail itself of noncompliance with the guid-
ance documents.73
The more likely challenge to a CO2 injection permit would 
come directly from NEPA claims in federal court and CEQA 
claims in state court. This is a particularly perilous aspect of the 
process, as the analysis of the environmental impact of the injec-
tion plan will come under public scrutiny for the first time when 
the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), under NEPA, 
or the Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”), under CEQA, is 
prepared. Given the developing 
nature of GCCS, a project may 
be particularly vulnerable, espe-
cially in litigious jurisdictions, 
during the EIS/EIR process in the 
event that a litigious private party 
or environmental group desires to 
slow or prevent the development 
of GCCS technology and proj-
ects.74 These costs and/or delays 
are certainly possible even if an 
operator meticulously adheres to 
NEPA or CEQA requirements, such as the adequate discussion 
of alternatives and cumulative impacts, and avoidance of project 
segmentation.
Similarly, it is not unusual for the construction of a well 
to require a permit pursuant to county or city ordinances. For 
instance, under the Police Powers provisions of the California 
State Constitution and in other jurisdictions, local agencies may 
require permit conditions that have a reasonable relationship to 
the purpose of the permit.75 Thus, methods of construction, as 
long as they are consistent with the requirements of the State 
Department of Gas, Oil & Geothermal Resources, may be part 
of the local permit. A challenge to these permits would also 
likely come under CEQA.
Geologic Sequestration and Injection Versus  
Allegedly Induced Seismic Activity
A number of reported instances of seismic activity induced 
by large scale human activities exist, such as underground 
nuclear explosions and construction projects.76 Allegations of 
geothermal plant activity resulting in seismic activity during 
the 1990s in California did not apparently result in any finan-
cial awards to potential plaintiffs. In addition, in the 1960s some 
believed injected waste fluid triggered seismic activity in the 
Rocky Mountains, although this was not substantiated. How-
ever, this should not be viewed as a shield to such allegations 
in the future.
Although the depth of the target saline aquifer is generally 
substantially below the level of any seismic activity associated 
with the circumstances above, litigation risk exists because 
California is subject to notable seismic activities and no nexus 
need be proven before litigation is commenced. While the fre-
quency of seismic activity in California could provide opportu-
nities for plaintiffs to allege a nexus between GCCS activities 
and any specific seismicity, the historic background of recurrent 
seismic activity in California may make it difficult for a plaintiff 
to establish causation. If litigated, the general concepts of tort 
liability discussed above would apply.
lookIng ForwarD: The neeD For cerTaInTy
At a minimum, this survey of California law shows that 
given the unknowns, the question of litigation over a project is 
one of “when” and “on what grounds.” However, many poten-
tial GCCS operators may not view themselves as pioneers. 
While prudent contracting and 
operations, along with adequate 
insurance, typically reduce risk 
exposure, the long time horizon 
of sequestration poses unique 
liabilities and responsibilities 
that industry and current legal 
systems appear ill-equipped to 
address. But the chorus of gov-
ernment, industry, and envi-
ronmental voices emphasizing 
GCCS as a climate change solu-
tion seems to argue that allowing a protracted period for courts 
to the develop the applicable law is inconsistent with the public 
interest. Notably, the recently proposed Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act, which contains the Energy Improvement and 
Extension Act, began forcing these issues by providing GCCS 
tax incentives and requiring the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
conjunction with EPA, to establish regulations setting security 
measures to ensure CO2 remains sequestered.
77 This first step 
hopefully will evolve into a substantial and expeditious reso-
lution of these issues. Nevertheless, a number of precedents 
may provide a conceptual basis to address the unique issues of 
sequestration including post-operational issues.
Programs like the Acute Orphan Well Account, the Haz-
ardous and Idle-Deserted Well Abatement Fund, and the Meth-
ane Gas Hazards Reduction Assistance programs may prove as 
 stepping stones to addressing GCCS liability over the expected 
timeline, but they do not provide a shared solution when the 
injector, operator, or owner of the stored substance is financially 
viable.78 These programs also only involve discovery of releases 
during the operational life of a project. Further, they do not cut 
off an operator’s liability after well closure.
Other precedents may serve as more useful models, includ-
ing the Price Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act and 
the National Flood Insurance Program. The former is similar to 
an industry liability pooling plan.79 On the other hand, the latter 
guarantees insurance to at-risk communities.80 Similarly, many 
GCCS commentators have called for government assumption of 
monitoring and liability after a reasonable time, such as 10 years 
following the end of injections.81
A GCCS project may 
encounter tort, nuisance, 
negligence, and/or strict 
liability claims.
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Another important matter for consideration is granting 
operators some form of eminent domain, similar to grants by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or state public utility 
commissions for gas pipelines.82 This would presumably require 
new federal or state legislation, but would greatly reduce lia-
bility risks, project costs, and expedite development of GCCS 
(the lack of such power when it comes to alternative energy 
power lines is an analogous failure of the legal system to adapt 
to changing needs). Of course, much of the concern would dis-
sipate if the migration of CO2 is treated similarly to the state’s 
basis for water regulation and air traffic—that is, absent some 
reasonable expectation of use or actual damage, no claim lies for 
a property owner.
conclusIon
In light of the enormous potential for GCCS to be a useful 
tool in the battle against climate change, thoughtful but expedi-
tious resolution of these issues is clearly in the public interest, 
both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, legislative 
gridlock and political partisanship have too often been part of 
recent legislative processes. However, the generally accepted 
need to aggressively address the continued massive infusion of 
CO2 into our atmosphere should provide focus and incentives to 
our leaders. Given the need to address GCCS and its associated 
legal obstacles, one can only hope lawmakers move faster than 
hydro-dynamically trapped CO2.
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